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I. INTRODUCTION
The fast-paced changes in the global economy and the conse-
quent influence on the law of international trade, particularly af-
ter the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, have made
anachronisms of commerce-related national laws in several
* Member of the Brazilian and Portuguese Bars; Senior partner of Noronha Ad-
vogados; President of the Brazilian Bar's Commission on the GATT; WTO panelist;
LL.B., Catholic University of Sio PAulo, 1974.
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countries. Such laws were the results of predominant GATT-
inconsistent attitudes of a largely protectionist character in a dif-
ferent era. As with old habits, old laws die hard. Thus,
throughout the world, adjustments to the new international legal
reality have become a necessary and painstaking process.
I would like to thank the University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review for allowing me to choose this topic for to-
day's presentation. I have done so with the sole purpose of high-
lighting the magnitude of the obstacles to be encountered in the
legal framework of different relevant national laws before a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) may be founded, as it must,
on the rule of law.
The disproportionate size of the U.S. economy in the pro-
jected FTAA, as well as its history of political isolation and eco-
nomic unilateralism, warrant an indepth study of the internal
structure of U.S. laws and their relation to international law.
My presentation today will focus on the following: the kinds of
international agreements under U.S. law, the formation and
implementation of treaties under U.S. law, the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties (Convention)' and U.S. law, and the
U.S. trade legislation and Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff
Act.2
II. THE KINDS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS UNDER
U.S. LAW
Under U.S. law, a distinction is made between treaties and
other international agreements. In contrast, both treaties and
"executive agreements" are considered treaties as that term is
used in international law. This distinction bears significant le-
gal differences and makes relevant certain practical conse-
quences deriving domestically in the United States.
The United States makes the following classifications of in-
ternational agreements under U.S. law: 1) treaties; 2) congres-
sional executive agreements; and 3) presidential executive
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered
into force on Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
2. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975), amended by Omnibus Trade and
Competitive Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2419 (1988)) [hereinafter Trade and Tariff Act of 1974].
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agreements. Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, treaties must be
procured through the advice and consent of the Senate. The sec-
ond kind of international agreement is the congressional execu-
tive agreement. These fall into two subcategories: "previously"
and "subsequently" authorized. In previously authorized execu-
tive agreements, Congress enacts legislation delegating to the
President the authority to enter into such agreements.
3 In sub-
sequently authorized executive agreements, the President seeks
authority from Congress to accept his previously made agree-
ment as a binding international commitment of the United
States. 4 The final kind, the presidential executive agreement,
requires that the President accept an agreement as binding on
the United States by virtue of his inherent power under the Con-
stitution without any congressional approval.5
Federal statutes and treaties are deemed to be of equal
rank. Thus, if a treaty and federal statute conflict with each
other, courts tend to construe as operative law the one made last
in time. Both treaties and federal statutes prevail over executive
agreements in cases of conflict. Additionally, treaties prevail
over state law. The U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland
6
held that valid treaties prevail over state law, even if a U.S. fed-
eral statute on the same subject might be considered an uncon-
stitutional interference with state power in the absence of the
treaty.
The President has the "[p]ower, by and with the [aidvice and
[c]onsent of the Senate, to make [t]reaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur ... ."7 The treaty power is thus di-
vided between the executive branch and the legislative branch of
the U.S. government. The Senate's role is to advise and to con-
sent to a treaty; the President's role is to make and to ratify or
accede to a treaty. The Senate can condition its consent on the
requirement that the President amend the treaty, or that the
President enter certain "reservations." The President may ratify
or accede to the treaty only with the Senate's changes.
3. See, e.g., id. § 101 (authorizing the United States to enter into trade agreements).
4. See, e.g., Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 286c (West 1990).
5. For example, agreements made under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S.
Constitution are Presidential Executive agreements. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
6. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
7. U.S. CONST. art. U, § 2.
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The Senate' Committee on Foreign Relations (Committee)
has exclusive jurisdiction over treaties and executive agree-
ments. The Committee prepares the resolution that gives the
Senate's consent to the ratification of the treaty. The Senate
may base its approval on conditions set forth in the resolution.
Conditions can be amendments, reservations, understandings,
declarations, and statements (or provisos). They may be offered
at any time during the Committee's deliberations or during con-
sideration in the full Senate prior to the vote on the resolution.
A majority vote is required in the Committee and in the
Senate to incorporate a condition into the resolution. Adoption
of the resolution then requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate.
The Senate has several options. It can amend, make a reserva-
tion, issue a Senate "understanding" or "declaration" regarding
the general issue, or make "statements regarding related issues
of United States law."8
After the Senate consents to a treaty, the President is free to
ratify it. Ratification is the formal process of declaring the will-
ingness of the state to be bound by a treaty. Ratification is
usually confirmed in a formal document called an "instrument of
ratification." The President must give effect to all conditions im-
posed by the Senate for its consent. If the President decides
that, under international law, the treaty cannot be interpreted
as the Senate has required, he has no authority to ratify the
treaty unless the instrument of ratification is accompanied by
express language conforming to the Senate's understanding. The
instrument of ratification includes the title of the treaty, the
date of signature, the countries involved, and the languages
used. The President can also attach a statement of understand-
ing or a declaration regarding the Senate's understanding of a
treaty, even if the Senate did not offer a formal reservation or
understanding.
To be bound internationally, a country must exchange or de-
posit its instrument of ratification. This international act of ex-
change or deposit, specifically, allows the formal entry into force
of a treaty which usually occurs at a later specified date. Gen-
8. Enactment of a Law-Executive Business and Executive Sessions (visited Sept.
22, 1997) (http:// thomas.loc.govihome/enactmentexecutive.html#treaties); 25.1 Adoption
of Treaties, Treaties in Domestic Law-United States (last modified Oct. 1, 1995)(http://cec.org/infobases/law/Data.cfi?format=l&Country-US&Language=english&uniq-
ue=120).
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erally, bilateral treaties are exchanged, while multilateral trea-
ties are deposited. If treaties are to be deposited, they usually
state where and with whom.
When the necessary exchange or deposit has been completed
and the treaty has entered into force, the President issues a
presidential proclamation that the agreement is in force. The
proclamation of a treaty is a national act by which the text of a
ratified treaty is publicized. After signing, the President returns
the proclamation with his signature to the Secretary of State,
who will publish it with the treaty text in United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements and register it with the
United Nations Secretariat pursuant to the United Nations
Charter Article 102. Under Article 102, no party can invoke a
treaty agreement before any organ of the United Nations until it
is registered with the United Nations.9
III. THE FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES
UNDER U.S. LAw
The U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, also known as
the Supremacy Clause, states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.10
Article III of the Constitution provides that cases arising under
treaties are within the judicial power of the United States." The
framers of the U.S. Constitution adopted this language to mini-
mize treaty violations attributable to the United States: a goal
which they hoped to advance through empowering the courts to
enforce treaties at the behest of affected individuals without
awaiting authorization from state or federal legislatures.
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 102, para. 2.
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.
11. Id. art. III, § 2.
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While the Supremacy Clause appears to be dispositive of the
effect that treaties are to have on domestic law, judicial decisions
since the signing of the Constitution have given the clause a
myriad of interpretations. Furthermore, although the Constitu-
tion mandates that treaties are to be regarded as "law," and
therefore enforceable by the courts without prior domestic legis-
lation, this does not mean that treaties may be enforced by any-
one at any time. The principal controversy in interpreting the
Supremacy Clause-and the extent to which a treaty or certain
treaty provisions may be operative under domestic law-arises
from the distinction made between "self-executing" and "non-
self-executing" treaties,1 2 despite the fact that the Clause itself
makes no distinction between treaties as such.
Whether or not a treaty or executive agreement is self-
executing-sometimes referred to as "directly applicable"-is a
matter of constant interpretation in the American judicial sys-
tem. In theory, the issue was decided in 1829 in the case of Fos-
ter v. Neilson where Chief Justice John Marshall, addressing the
issue of a treaty's domestic law effect, stated:
Our Constitution declared a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is, consequently, to be regarded in the courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of
itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty ad-
dresses itself to the political, not to the judicial department,
and the legislature must execute the contract before it can be-
come a rule for the court. 13
Foster was an ejectment action in which the plaintiffs
claimed title to a tract of land in West Florida on the basis of a
grant from Spain. The treaty, by which sovereignty over the
territory that included the disputed land, was transferred to the
United States, and provided in the English text that the Spanish
grants "shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in posses-
sion .... "14 The plaintiffs argued that the treaty confirmed their
12. A "self-executing" treaty is a treaty which may be enforced in the courts without
prior legislation by Congress. A "non-self-executing" treaty may not be enforced in courts
without prior legislative implementation.
13. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
14. Id. at 310.
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title to the property and that the Court was, therefore, required
to recognize their title to the land.' 5 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that it could not recognize their title to the land until
Congress enacted legislation confirming the grants.
16
The Court in Foster regarded the question of whether the
treaty operated of itself as a matter of treaty construction. The
Court focused on the treaty's language, stating that had the
treaty provided that the grants were "hereby" confirmed, it
would have confirmed the grants. 17 However, the Court inter-
preted the English text of the treaty stating "shall be ratified
and confirmed" as contemplating a future act of ratification by
the United States.'8 As "shall be ratified and confirmed" was ex-
ecutory in nature, the provision had to be executed before the
Court would recognize the grants. 19
Thus, Foster created the first of many distinctions concern-
ing the enforcement and applicability of treaties domestically,
even after the precepts of the Supremacy Clause were accepted.
Foster stands for the proposition that the general rule estab-
lished by the Supremacy Clause, under which treaties are en-
forceable in the courts without prior legislation, is narrower than
previously thought in that there is a presumption that treaties
are not necessarily self-executing if they may be altered by the
parties to the treaty itself. Specifically, a treaty which otherwise
might be self-executing pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, may
not be self-executing where the parties to the treaty--or, per-
haps, even the U.S. treaty negotiators alone-intended that the
treaty's objective be accomplished through intervening acts of
legislation.
Interestingly, United States v. Percheman,20 a subsequent
case stemming from the same treaty discussed in Foster, ap-
peared at the time to have reversed the Foster decision by inter-
preting the Supremacy Clause to include a presumption that
treaties are self-executing. In Percheman, the Supreme Court
was given a Spanish text of the treaty which provided, in perti-
nent part, that grants "shall remain ratified and confirm-
15. Id. at 277.
16. Id. at 314.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 315.
19. Id.
20. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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ed ... ,"21 The Percheman Court held that the language did not
"stipulat[e] for some future legislative act,"22 and thus it could
enforce the land grants without waiting for legislation to provide
for such. However, some 150 years after the Foster and Perche-
man cases, Judge Bork in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic cited Foster for the proposition that
"[t]reaties of the United States ... do not generally create rights
that are privately enforceable in courts."23 Lower federal courts
have subsequently held that Foster may be interpreted to create
a presumption that U.S. treaties are not self-executing, notwith-
standing the Percheman decision.2 4
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Restatement) 25 summarizes very well the impli-
cations and repercussions of international law and international
agreements as law of the United States:
1. International law and international agreements of the
United States are law of the United States and supreme over
the law of the several States.
2. Cases arising under international law or international
agreements of the United States are within the judicial power
of the United States and, subject to Constitutional and statu-
tory limitations and requirements of justiciability, and are
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
3. Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to in-
ternational law and to international agreements of the United
States, except that a "non-self-executing" agreement will not
be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implemen-
tation.
21. Id. at 88.
22. Id. at 88-89.
23. 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
24. See, e.g., Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1929)
(holding that, pursuant to Foster, "language of futurity' indicates that a treaty provision is
not self-executing).
25. RESTATEMENT (THlRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement, published by the American Law In-
stitute (AlI), which was founded in 1923 in order to gather, synthesize, organize, and sim-
plify the common law of the United States, is the primary tool the AlU uses to reach its
goals. The Restatement attempts to gather and synthesize the case law on a topic, to organ-
ize it, and to present the "rules" distilled from the cases. These "rules" are the All's at-
tempt of providing reference on the law.
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4. An international agreement of the United States is "non-
self-executing":
a. if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not
become effective as domestic law without the enactment of
implementing legislation;
b. if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by
resolution, requires implementing legislation; or
c. if implementing legislation is constitutionally required.
26
As will be discussed in Part IV, intent of the parties is one of
the crucial factors considered by a U.S. court when determining
whether a treaty may be deemed self-executing, such that it may
be enforced in a U.S. court. Recent court decisions, however,
have expanded upon the notion of "the parties' intent" to include
one party's intent as a basis for analysis of the treaty. In an ef-
fort to obviate any doubt about a treaty's status of being self-
executing, U.S. treaty negotiators have recently added clauses to
treaties through "declarations" which have expressed their in-
tent that the treaty is not self-executing, 27 and lower courts have
even given conclusive weight to the aforementioned unilateral
American declarations of non-self-execution. 28 Other sources of
determination of "intent" accepted by American courts, in addi-
tion to the intent of both parties to the international agreement,
have included the intent of the U.S. treaty negotiators, the
President in transmitting it to the Senate for its advice and con-
sent, and even the intent of the Senate in giving its advice and
consent.
29
The Restatement apparently accepts the practice discussed
above, stating:
In the absence of a special agreement, it is ordinarily for the
United States to decide how it will carry out its international
26. Id.§ ill.
27. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
28. See, e.g., infra note 31.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 881-83 (5th Cir. 1979) (relying on
preratification statements of State Department officials and U.S. negotiators); Edwards v.
Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1057 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (relying on preratification statements by




obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the United States
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in
the United States or should await implementation by legisla-
tion or appropriate executive or administrative action. If the
international agreement is silent as to its self-executing char-
acter and the intention of the United States is unclear, ac-
count must be taken of any statement by the President in
concluding the agreement or in submitting it to the Senate for
consent or to the Congress as a whole for approval, and of any
expression by the Senate or by Congress in dealing with the
agreement.3 0
In addition to distorting the principle established in the Su-
premacy Clause to focus on the unilateral intent of the United
States, some lower federal courts have construed the "intent" is-
sue to ask not whose intent, but rather the intent about what.
Accordingly, recent decisions have interpreted Foster and
Percheman in a manner which establishes that, in the absence of
evidence of an intent on the part of the drafters of the treaties to
make them enforceable in courts of law, they are thus non-self-
executing and will not be enforceable in the courts without prior
legislative implementation.3 1
Regardless of the fact that it is entirely possible for some
provisions of a treaty to be self-executing while others are not,32
many courts have taken an all or nothing approach in determin-
ing whether a treaty is self-executing and, thus, judicially en-
forceable in the United States without prior legislative imple-
mentation. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found the treaty language, "[e]very country party to this
Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its consti-
tution, the measures necessary to insure the application of this
Convention," to reflect the parties' intent that the treaty was not
to be considered as self-executing.3 3
In addition to questioning the "intent" of the parties in de-
termining whether or not a treaty is self-executing, many courts
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 111, cmt. h.
31. Postal, 589 F.2d at 876-77; Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965,
968 (4th Cir. 1992).
32. "If an international agreement or one of its provisions is non-self-executing, the
United States is under an international obligation to adjust its laws and institutions as may
be necessary to give effect to the agreement." RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 111, cmt. h.
33. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979).
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have examined other factors. These additional factors create a
second hurdle that must be overcome to enforce a treaty provi-
sion in the United States, even once it is established that the
treaty is self-executing or the necessary legislation has in fact
been implemented to give it effect domestically. Other factors
which courts will consider include whether the claim is
"justiciable," whether the litigant has standing, and whether the
litigant has a "right of action." In an attempt to simplify their
analysis of these additional issues, many courts have converted
the issues into a formula composed of factors which they will
consider in determining whether a treaty is self-executing.
These factors include the following: the language of the agree-
ment;3 4 the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
agreement; 35 the class of the agreement (addressing the group in
which constitutional treaties are classified);3 6 the subject matter
of the agreement; 37 the history of the agreement;3 the historical
purpose of the agreement;3 9 and the parties' own "practical con-
struction" of the treaty (i.e., their course of dealing).40
An example of the kind of issue related to justiciability for
which courts often will apply these factors is whether treaty
provisions are meant to be obligatory on the parties or merely
"precatory" in nature, more similar to recommended or wistful
thoughts or wishes than direct commands. American jurispru-
dence has taken great pains to demonstrate that courts will not
oversee actions for which there is no obligation to be imposed on
the defendant. In the context of treaties, U.S. courts, by apply-
ing justiciability analyses,41 are further expanding the concepts
of non-self-execution first brought forth in Foster. It should be
noted that the determination of what is and is not considered
precatory language 42 and, thus, what constitutes a self-executing
34. Sei Fuji v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 721-22 (1952).
35. Id.
36. See Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 37 (1931).
37. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947).
38. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963).
39. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59 (1964).
40. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933).
41. Specifically, those which under U.S. constitutional law are regarded as analyses of
whether an issue addresses a "political question," which, under the U.S. system of separa-
tion of powers, are left for the other branches of government (e.g., legislative or executive) to
determine.
42. Language such as "use our best efforts," "cooperate" to achieve certain goals,
"promote" or "encourage" certain principles is an example of precatory language.
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and judicially enforceable treaty is generally considered to be a
matter of U.S. municipal constitutional law.43
A final issue which American courts will consider in deter-
mining what effect to give treaties under U.S. law is whether
private parties may pursue an action in court to enforce a treaty
provision. This issue is often linked to the issue of whether a
party has standing to sue. Standing issues under U.S. law, as
applicable to treaties, have yet to be fully enunciated by the
courts. However, it is clear that there is no American doctrine
which mandates that private parties may only enforce treaty
provisions in court if the treaty itself provides for a private right
of action. Currently, in bilateral as well as plurilateral interna-
tional trade agreements, there is the robust tendency to allow
private right of action." Such a development is due to the lack
of significant enforcement measures in international law and to
the fact that it is often through national courts that interna-
tional law is enforced. This is explicitly allowed by both the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as by
the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL).45
IV. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES AND
ITS EFFECTS VIS-A-ViS U.S. LAw
The Convention" attempts to codify international law re-
garding treaties as well as, on a minor scale, to promote pro-
gressive developments in the area, focusing on such issues as
conclusion, entry into force, observance and application, reser-
vations, interpretation as well as invalidity, termination, and
suspension of the operation of treaties.
43. Carlos M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L
L. 695, 712-13 (1995); see also Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama v. Board of County
Comm'r of Dade County, 197 F. Supp. 230, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1961). However, courts have
rarely explored the question of whether they may also be bound by any international law on
the subject.
44. The place of private parties within the system of international law has been a
cause of controversy for some considerable time. Originally, international law was a system
of rules governing the relations between sovereign states, and many of the rules of the sys-
tem still reflect this. Presently, however, international law has extended its scope beyond
its traditional areas, such as in trade and human rights. See generally MARTIN DIXON &
ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (1991).
45. DURVAL DE NORONHA GOYOS, JR., GATT, MERCOSUL & NAFTA 220 (1996).
46. Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
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The provisions of the Convention are binding only upon the
parties to it. 4 7  Further, the provisions are applicable only to
treaties entered into subsequent to the Convention's entry into
force. However, as many of its covenants were customary inter-
national law, 48 or have become such, they are applicable to all
treaties, even if the states concerned are not parties to the Con-
vention. Indeed, those provisions of the Convention which are
not declaratory of customary international law may constitute
presumptive evidence of emerging rules of international law.
Even those areas that were inserted in the Convention for
progressive development rather than codification have, to a great
extent, passed into the general corpus of international law be-
cause of the sheer weight of their incorporation in the Conven-
tion. The most striking of these is the law on reservations, con-
tained in Articles 19-23, which did not represent universal
practice at the time of its adoption.49 The articles on modifica-
tion, Articles 40-41, some of the articles on invalidity and termi-
nation, and the rules on jus cogens are similar in this regard.50
Article 26 of the Convention establishes the rule pacta sunt ser-
vanda in the law of treaties and the principle of good faith in in-
ternational agreements. 51 Article 27 determines that a sovereign
state cannot invoke its internal law as an international legal
justification for failing to perform its obligations under a treaty.52
47. A distinction is drawn in international law between the international legal obliga-
tions of a state which is a party to a treaty and a state which is a signatory to a treaty. Un-
der Article 11 of the Vienna Convention, states may consent to be bound by a treaty
"through signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed." Id. art. 11.
48. These are, for instance, the rule of interpretation, derived from the Beagle Chan-
nel Arbitration (Arg. v. Chile) 1 Int'l Arb. Proc. 307 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1977), the rule of fun-
damental change of circumstances, derived from the Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K v. Iceland),
1974 I.C.J. 3 and the rule of material breach, derived from the Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. 16.
49. Indeed, the law on reservations is quite important, as Article 19 of the Vienna
Convention allows the formulation of a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do no include the
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 19.
In addition, Article 17 establishes that the consent of a state to be bound by part of
a treaty will only be effective if the treaty so permits or the other contracting powers so
agree. Id. art. 17.
50. MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
51. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 26.
52. Id. art. 27.
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This rule is to be interpreted in conjunction with Article 46,
which disallows a state from claiming that its consent to be
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of its internal
law unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of
its internal law of fundamental importance.
The United States, though a participant in and signatory of
the Convention, has not ratified the Convention. On November
21, 1971, the President of the United States transmitted the
treaty to the Senate for its consent to ratification, but thus far
the Senate has not acted upon it. In considering whether to give
their consent to the Convention, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee sought to equate "treaties" as used in the Convention
with "treaties" as used in the U.S. Constitution. The Senate de-
clared that every agreement that is a "treaty" under the conven-
tion can be concluded as such by the United States only by the
process prescribed for "treaties" under the Constitution.53 The
Senate's position was rejected by the executive branch. The
Senate attempted to uphold and reserve current American law
which conflicts with many Articles of the Convention. 54 Notably,
the exception available under Article 46 would not be applicable
to the United States, as it is restricted to the manifest violations
objectively evident to any state conducting itself in the matter in
accordance with normal practice and in good faith.
Consequently, U.S. municipal law displays numerous areas
of inconsistency with international law concerning the domestic
enforcement of international agreements, an area which is of
great relevance in today's world, particularly in connection with
bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements. As a
result of such inconsistencies, "the possibility arises that a U.S.
court could come to a conclusion contrary to that of international
law, and that such court decision would cause a breach of United
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, pt. II, n.4.
54. The conflicting Vienna Convention Articles include, but are not limited to the fol-
lowing: Article 12 (consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by signature); Article 13
(consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by an exchange of instruments constituting a
treaty); Article 14 (consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance, or
approval); Article 19 (formulation of reservations); Article 24 (entry into force); Article 26
(pacta sunt servanda); Article 27 (internal law and observance of treaties); Article 31
(general rule of interpretation); Article 32 (supplementary means of interpretation); Article
42 (validity and continuance in force of treaties); and Article 46 (provisions of internal law
regarding competence to conclude treaties). Vienna Convention, supra note 1, arts. 12-14,
19, 24, 27, 31, 32, 42, 46.
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States international obligations."5 5 This situation of obstinate
refusal to limitations on its sovereignty by international law puts
the United States in a singularly unique position in the interna-
tional community. In contrast, the United Kingdom, for exam-
ple, is a party to the Convention and, by the European Commu-
nities Act 1972, has incorporated the European Communities
treaties into its national law, both of which represent an in-
fringement of Parliament's sovereignty. 6
V. THE U.S. TRADE LEGISLATION AND SECTION 301 OF THE
TRADE AND TARIFF ACT OF 1974
A. General Legal Background
Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 197457 authorizes
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and sanc-
tion countries whose trade practices are deemed "unfair" to U.S.
interests.58 It contains both mandatory and discretionary provi-
sions and specific timetables for USTR action. This Section
originated as a revision to Section 252 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962,59 which allowed the President to restrict imports
from countries that "unjustifiably" or "unreasonably" restricted
U.S. exports. Section 301 also expanded the President's author-
ity to impose tariff and nontariff import restrictions.60
A series of amendments to Section 301 have been concluded
with the intention of expanding its scope as well as creating an
arsenal of retaliatory actions with a view to ensuring the respec-
tive removal of offending foreign trade practices. Thus, the
Trade Agreements Act of 197961 amendments to Section 301 set
forth specific time frames for investigations and their final
resolution. The Trade Act of 198462 provided further amend-
55. John H. Jackson, United States of America, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN
DOMESTIC LAW, 141, 154 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
56. DIxON & MCCORQUODALE, supra note 44, at 100.
57. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 §§ 2411-2419.
58. Id. § 301(d)(1).
59. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, & 252, 76 Stat. 872 (1992).
60. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 § 301(a).
61. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 295
(1979) (implementing legislation for the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Agreement) [hereinafter Tokyo Round].
62. Trade And Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
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ments, such as requiring the preparation of an annual national
trade estimate as well as providing for self-initiation of Section
301 investigations by the USTR.
The most recent amendments, contained in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,63 transfer final deci-
sionmaking authority in Section 301 cases from the President to
the USTR. Most significantly, the 1988 amendments require
mandatory action when a foreign government's policy is deemed
"inconsistent" with its obligations under a trade agreement with
the United States or is otherwise "unjustifiable." "Unreason-
able" and "discriminatory" practices on the part of a foreign gov-
ernment warrant retaliatory action on the part of the USTR.64
The arsenal for action in the Trade Act of 1988 came with the
expansion of Section 301 to comprise three new categories:
"Super 301," "Special 301," and "Telecommunications 301," all of
which allowed the executive office to make sanctions in respect
of the provisions therein.
"Super 301" was intended to be a temporary measure in
1989 and 1990, but since became integrated into the pre-existing
U.S. law, under which the USTR was required to prepare, on
schedule, a list of foreign trade barriers, a priority list of coun-
tries and their alleged "unreasonable" practices, a timetable for
their removal, and in case of failure, a schedule for sanctions on
the part of the United States. "Special 301" is very much similar
to "Super 301" in its methodology, but addresses specifically the
field of intellectual property. "Telecommunications 301," similar
to the other categories, is designed to combat the "closed" nature
of foreign telecommunications markets.
Among the sanctions available under Section 301 are the
abilities to "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or
refrain from proclaiming, benefits of trade agreement conces-
sions"6 5 and to impose duties or other import restrictions on the
goods or impose "fees or restrictions on the services of such for-
eign country" for such time as the USTR shall deem appropri-
ate.66 Broad discretionary powers are conferred upon the USTR
not only for imposing sanctions, but also to enter into "binding"
63. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988).
64. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
65. Id. § 2411(c)(1)(A).
66. Id. § 2411(c)(1)(B).
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agreements that commit such foreign countries to: "a) eliminate,
or phase out, the act, policy, or practice; b) eliminate any burden
or restriction; or c) provide the United States with compensatory
trade benefits."67
B. The Legality of Section 301 Under International
Law
There are few doubts that the development of aggressive
unilateralism in the United States in the early sixties, evident in
the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, is intimately
linked to the declining competitiveness of the U.S. economy on a
global scale. The share of U.S. products in world exports fell
from seventeen percent in 1950 to eleven percent in 1980.68 Ac-
cording to Jagdish Bhagwati, "the concerns with fairness of trade
and with opening foreign markets arose in the early 1980s and
must be traced, in subtle ways ... , to the acceleration of import
protectionism during the first term of the Reagan Administra-
tion."69 Helen Milner noted that, in 1985:
as a result of concerns over the huge U.S. trade deficits and
mounting protectionist pressures, Congress began action on a
new trade bill... . Many in Congress felt that strong action
needed to be taken to reduce the trade deficit... . Responding
to domestic pressures, the administration announced its sup-
port for "fair trade," not just free trade. 70
Subsequently, the U.S. administration compromised and cooper-
ated with Congress in writing a new bill that would become the
Trade Act of 1988.
Similarly, there is almost universal consensus that unilat-
eral action taken based on "Super 301" violates, in at least three
different ways, basic norms of the GATT. In the first place, any
retaliation based on the imposition of ad valorem tariffs applied
67. Id. § 2411(c)(1)(D).
68. See GOYOS, supra note 45, at 193.
69. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE AND POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1991).
70. Helen Milner, The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super
301 Provision, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 163, 166-67 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1991).
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selectively will violate the principle of the Most Favored Nation
(MFN) clause enshrined in Article 1 of the GATT. Second, as a
result, such tariffs would be established at a level higher than
that set in the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and thus, there
would also be a violation of Article 2. Third, the fact that the
United States would at the same time be the self-appointed
prosecutor and jury of a foreign state in a tribunal not sanc-
tioned by international law would represent a violation of a vast
array of different norms.
During the Uruguay Round, actions under the "Super 301"
were often justified with the argument that the multilateral sys-
tem of the GATT did not allow for an efficient system of dispute
resolution. 7 1 This view also substantiated U.S. initiatives during
the Uruguay Round to modify dispute resolution within the
GATT, which were endorsed by the international community, in
the hope that the increasingly juridical nature of the system
would enhance the rule of law in international trade.7 2 As a
matter of fact, the increased respect for the rule of law in the
Uruguay Round treaties was hailed by the then Director-General
of the GATT as one of the respective three major achievements. 73
Even with the upgraded dispute resolution system resulting
from the Uruguay Round in place under the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) modeled very much along U.S. suggestions,
the United States has not ceased to resort to unilateral practices
illegal under international law. According to a study prepared
by the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers, in just a four
year period (1993-1996), sixty-one U.S. laws and executive ac-
tions, targeting thirty-five countries, were enacted authorizing
unilateral economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. 74 In
addition, the United States continues to have a poor record in
71. This argument was extensively utilized even though up to 1989 the United
States was the undisputed leader of noncompliance with adverse legal rulings from
GATT dispute settlement proceedings. See Robert E. Hudec, Thinking about the New
Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301
TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 113 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Pat-
rick eds., 1991).
72. See generally DURVAL DE NORONHA GOYOS, JR., A OMC E Os TRATADOS DA
RODADA URUGUAI [MERCOSUL AND THE URUGUAY ROUND] (1995).
73. Peter Sutherland, The Rule of Law in International Trade Relations, Speech in
SAo PAulo, Brazil, at the invitation of the GATT Commission of the Brazilian Bar (July 6,
1994).
74. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNI-
LATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993-1996 (1997).
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implementing adverse GATT-WTO dispute resolution deci-
sions. 75
VI. CONCLUSION
In the United States, there are two thresholds to consider
when analyzing the legal status of international agreements and
the respective enforcement thereof under domestic law. The first
threshold is whether the international agreement is considered a
"treaty" or a "presidential executive agreement." Treaties are
deemed to have the same hierarchy of federal laws, overruling
the previous ones and being overruled by subsequent ones.
Presidential executive agreements are subordinated to federal
law. Both treaties and presidential executive agreements are
deemed to be of higher rank than state laws. The second
threshold is whether the international agreement is "self-
executing" or "non-self-executing." U.S. courts will not recognize
"non-self-executing" international agreements as local law and
will deny the respective enforceability thereof. In the absence of
very specific language as to the self-executing nature of an inter-
national agreement, any reference to "words of futurity" may be
construed to signify that the treaty in question is not to be con-
sidered self-executing.
U.S. legislators, diplomats, and trade negotiators always
have present in mind the basic thresholds referred to above dur-
ing the negotiation, execution, and ratification of any interna-
tional agreement. This attitude derives from an ingrained reluc-
tance to place international law over municipal law and may be
found even in the case of treaties that, under domestic law,
would revoke previous conflicting federal laws. This same reluc-
tance has consistently been shared by members of the American
judiciary. An example of this situation pertains to the U.S. in-
ternal legislation with respect to the implementation of the
treaties of the Uruguay Round, which establishes in Section
102(a) that "no provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United
States shall have effect."76 In addition, nothing in the legislation
75. See, e.g., Brazil, Venezuela Claim U.S. Slow to Implement Gasoline Ruling, 14
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 161 (Jan. 29, 1997).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
is to be constructed as limiting any authority conferred under
any law of the United States including Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974. Similarly, in connection with NAFTA, the apposite
United States implementing legislation in Section 102(a)(1)
reads that "no provision of the Agreement, nor the application of
any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is in-
consistent with any law of the United States shall have effect."77
These examples partly explain why the U.S. Senate never rati-
fied the Convention, as it establishes in Article 27 that a sover-
eign state may not invoke the provisions of its internal law asjustification for its failure to perform a treaty. Such covenants
inserted in the United States, NAFTA, and Uruguay Round im-
plementing legislation are flagrantly contrary to international
law in general and specifically to numerous provisions of the
Convention, including Article 26 which establishes that "every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith."78 This situation compromises the
position of the United States as a bona fide party to any inter-
national agreement and is further aggravated by the attempts of
the United States to enforce its domestic laws 79 abroad while es-
chewing acceptance of international law. Accordingly, recent re-
ports by the WTO Secretariat on the United States, for purpose
of the trade policy review mechanism, indicated that the U.S.
multi-track approach-multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral-to
international trade policy can be a source of tension within the
multilateral system.80
In today's world, there is a trenchant tendency in interna-
tional law to allow private rights of action in bilateral as well as
in plurilateral trade and investment agreements. In such cases,
domestic implementation of international law is essential for the
enforcement of basic rights and assurance of fair competition. In
a free trade area, business cannot operate efficiently in an envi-
ronment that does not permit such enforcement. Therefore, the
discussed expedient, albeit illegal, attitude of the United States
allows nationals of that country to enforce such international
77. Id. § 3312.
78. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 26.
79. See, e.g., The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, Pub. L. No.
104-144, 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
80. Trade Policy Review Body, Reports by WTO's Secretariat, Summary Observa-
tions, Geneva, Oct. 31, 1996; (http://www.wto.org/wto/reviews/tprb46.htm) (visited July
28, 1997).
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agreements abroad while preventing nationals of other countries
from enforcing the same in U.S. courts against U.S. nationals.
The current legislative and judicial profile of the United
States domestic legal implementation of international law and
international agreements substantially compromises not only the
country's credibility as a responsible member of the international
community, but also the prospects of having it as a bona fide
trade partner. For business in general, as outlined by the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, 81 "foreign companies and
governments are understandably reluctant to enter into any
long-term commercial relationship with U.S. companies if the
threat of sanctions looms." From 1993 to 1996, all countries rep-
resenting the major economies of the Americas, including Brazil,
Canada, and Mexico among others, have been subject to U.S.
unilateral economic sanctions inconsistent with the GATT, in
spite of the new dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO and a
similar credible system within NAFTA. Historically, Brazil, in
particular, has been, together with Japan and India, a favorite
target of such unilateral measures, even with respect to the no-
torious balance of payment crisis of the 1980s, as well as a victim
of United States noncompliance with adverse panel decisions.
Thus, it should be hardly surprising that public opinion in Brazil
as well as the government itself are wary of a continued unilat-
eral regime of the United States which is inconsistent with in-
ternational law within the proposed FTAA.
81. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, supra note 74.
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